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Vicarious Liability of an Employer-Master:
Must There Be a Right of Control?*
JOHN DWIGHT INGRAM"

I. VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is liable for injuries
or damage to the person or property of third persons resulting from the acts
of the master's servant, if the acts of the servant are within the scope of the
servant's employment.' A servant is usually defined as a person who is
employed to perform services for another person (the master) and who is
subject to a right of control as to his 2 physical movements--the method by
which the work is done--by the master.3 Several rationales have been
asserted to justify the imposition of vicarious liability on the master:
(1) Liability tends to provide a spur toward careful selection, training
and supervision of employees;
(2) Since the employer receives the benefits of the activities of the
enterprise, he should also bear its burdens;
(3) Liability increases the likelihood of accident victims receiving
compensation--the "deep pocket" approach; and
(4) Liability will result in broad and equitable distribution of the cost
of accidents.4

* The words "master/employer" and "servant/employee" are often used
interchangeably, as if they were synonymous, which they are not. A master may not be an
employer, and an employer may not be a master. However, most commonly there is both
a master/servant and an employer/employee relationship.
** A.B., Harvard University; J.D., John Marshall Law School; Professor of Law, John
Marshall Law School. The valuable contributions of my very capable Research Assistants,
Brad Berliner, Alyson Ray, and David Bradford are gratefully acknowledged.
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979).
2. Masculine pronouns are used throughout for convenience and simplicity, to avoid
the rather awkward "he or she" or the grammatically incorrect "they."
3. Stockwell v. Morris, 22 P.2d 189, 191 (Wyo. 1933). Where an actor's employer
controls only the result, and not the method of accomplishing it, the actor is deemed to be
an independent contractor rather than a servant. Id.
4. See generally Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 139 (Alaska 1972).
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According to the Restatement (Second) of Agency,' the general test for
determining whether a servant's act is within the scope of employment is:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but
only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space
limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master; and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another,
the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
The origins of vicarious liability are probably ancient. Justice Holmes
traced the concept to Roman law; Wigmore found its roots to be Germanic.
Its emergence in English law has been placed as early as the 17th Century.'
It evolved and expanded rapidly with the growth of industry and commerce,
first in England 9 and soon in America. Historically, the test almost
universally applied has been the "right to control."' 0 To satisfy the
"control" test, the master must have the right to control the physical conduct
of the servant in the performance of the work. The master must have a right
to control "not only the results of the work, but [also] the manner in which
the work is to be performed."" In contrast, an independent contractor (the
name usually applied to a non-servant) has control over the manner of
performing the work, and is responsible to the one employing him only for
the result. 2 The issue "is not whether the employer did in fact control and
direct the employee in the work, but [rather] whether the employer has that
right .... "'3
Despite the traditional emphasis and reliance on the "control" test by
most courts, there are many cases where vicarious liability is imposed on an
employer for the tort of an employee where there is in fact little or no right
of control by the employer over the method of performing the specific work
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §228 (1958).
6. Id.
7. Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d at 139.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. John Bruntz, The Employer/Independent Contractor Dichotomy: A Rose Is Not
Always a Rose, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 337, 338-39 (1991).
11. Juarbe v. City of Philadelphia, 431 A.2d 1073, 1076 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Smalich v. Westfall, 269 A.2d 476 (1970)).
12. Drummond v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 501 F. Supp. 29, 31 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
13. Harrison & Ellis, Inc. v. Nashville Milling Co., 275 S.E.2d 374, 375 (Ga. Ct. App.
1980).
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or duties which caused injury to a third party. In many of these cases, the
right of control may apply to the employee's duties generally, but may apply
only minimally, if at all, to the specific act which caused the injury. And
in many cases, vicarious liability is imposed where there is no actualcontrol
at all; there is merely the appearanceof a right of control in the employer.
II. CONTROL TEST APPLIED BROADLY
There are many cases where vicarious liability is imposed on an
employer on the basis of the employer's right of control over the employee
generally even though the employer's actual control over the specific
activity which causes an injury is theoretical at most. All of the cases I
have seen which exemplify this situation have involved injuries resulting
from the negligent driving of a vehicle by a person who is alleged to be an
employee-servant acting in the scope of his employment.
A typical example is found in White v. Frenkel.'4 The injuries to
White occurred when Frenkel, driving White's car with White as a
The court first dispassenger, negligently collided with another car.'
cussed the distinction between an employee, whose actions can result in
vicarious liability for the employer, and an independent contractor.1 6 The
court listed the following guidelines to be used in making the decision:
(1) The existence of a valid contract between the parties;
(2) That the work being done was of an independent nature such that
the contractor may employ non-exclusive means in accomplishing
it;
(3) The contract calls for a specific piece of work as a unit to be done
according to the independent contractor's own methods without
being subject to the control and direction of the principal, except
as to result of the services to be rendered;
(4) The existence of a specific price for the overall undertaking; and
(5) A specific time and duration is agreed upon in the contract and is
not subject to termination at the will of either side without liability
for breach. 7
The court found that none of these elements were present, and thus
Frenkel was held to be an employee and not an independent contractor.1

14. 615 So. 2d 535 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
15. Id. at 538.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 540.
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Frenkel was a professional wrestler; he wrestled exclusively for Mid-South
Sports, Inc., and wrestled almost every night, traveling from city to city.19
Mid-South controlled who, where, and when he wrestled, who won each
match, how much he was paid,
could fine him for breaking rules, and could
20
will.
at
him
fire
did)
(and
Unquestionably, Mid-South had a substantial right of control over the
method of doing Frenkel's work as a wrestler. But did Mid-South have a
right of control over Frenkel's method of driving a car from the site of one
match to the next? Theoretically, perhaps. But such a right would rarely,
if ever, be exercised. For this court and others, an overall general right of
control will suffice for the imposition of vicarious liability on a driver's
employer. Control over the specific act which causes injury is not required,
and usually not even discussed in judicial opinions.
Another example is found in Natchez Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Watson.2' The driver of a Natchez Coca-Cola Bottling Co. truck was
employed to sell Coca-Cola on an assigned route, on a commission basis.22
Natchez furnished the truck and supplied all the oil and gas.23 The court
found that the driver "was a mere employee or salesman ... subject to the
control of the master to an extent sufficient to establish the relation of
master and servant." 24 Again, one can readily find a general right of
control over the truck driver's work. But whether that includes control over
the method of driving the truck is problematic.
Some courts do focus the "right of control" analysis more narrowly,
and consider only the question of control over the method of driving the
vehicle. Several cases have involved injuries caused by the negligent
driving of a newspaper carrier or distributor.25 In these cases, the courts
have pointed out that the newspaper company has no interest in the manner
or method of distribution; it is only interested in the result--getting the
newspapers to subscribers, and maintaining and building circulation.26 In
19. Id. at 539.
20. Id. at 539-40. The court also held that Frenkel was in the scope of his
employment, analogizing that he was like a salesman going fron customer to customer. He
had to drive from city to city to do his job, and Mid-South paid for his travel expenses. His
driving was a necessity, and was for the benefit of Mid-South. Id. at 540-41.
21. 133 So. 677 (Miss. 1931).
22. Id. at 680.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Rathbun v. Payne, 68 P.2d 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937); Ross v. Post
Publishing Co., 29 A.2d 768 (Conn. 1943); Brechbiel v. Hentgen, 8 N.E.2d 1007 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1937).
26. See 68 P.2d at 291-92.
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most cases the newspaper company does not give any directions as to the
route of travel or other matters involving the method of delivery.
A much clearer and more logical basis for the imposition of vicarious
liability on the employer of a negligent vehicle driver is to focus on whether
the driver was using the vehicle for the benefit of or on behalf of the
employer. This approach avoids the difficult and often questionable analysis
of the employer's right of control. A good example can be found in Fruit
v. Schreiner.21 In that case, an insurance salesman attended a sales
conference for three days. 28 He drove his own car to the site of the
conference and, while there, went from the conference hotel to bars and
restaurants where the salesmen socialized with each other and with guest
experts.29 While driving back to the conference hotel one night, he
skidded across the road and injured someone. 30 The court held that a jury
could find that he was in the scope of his employment and that his employer
was vicariously liable. 3 His driving on this occasion was part of his
conference attendance and benefitted his employer. 32 The court did not
address the question of right of control. If it had, it seems certain that no
right of control over the method of driving the car existed, and probably not
even control over his method of performing his other duties as a salesman.
There are other cases in which the court purports to find a right of
control, but where the true basis for imposing vicarious liability seems to be
the benefit to the employer. For example, in Whetstone v. Dixon,33 Dixon
was a deacon of the Faith and Truth Baptist Church.34 At the time of the
accident, Dixon was driving his own pick-up truck to load materials to be
used in remodeling the church.35 Since the church owned only a bus,
deacons were expected to use their own vehicles for such errands, and
Dixon had been chosen by several members of the board of deacons to get
these materials.36 The court pointed out that Dixon was told where to get

27. 502 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972). But see Gossett v. Simonson, 411 P.2d 277 (Or.
1966) (cottage cheese maker was driving his own car, on route of his own choosing, on his
own time, at his own expense, to a trade association meeting he had no duty to attend; court
held that mere benefit to employer is not enough, where driver was not performing job duties
when injury occurred).
28. Id. at 135.
29. Id. at 135-36.
30. Id. at 136.
31. Id. at 142.
32. Id.
33. 616 So. 2d 764 (La. Ct. App. 1993).

34. Id. at 766.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 770.
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the materials and when delivery was expected." Although no specific time
or route of travel were dictated to Dixon, the court said that for people at
higher levels of authority and responsibility precise details were unnecessary. 38 The court thus impliedly found a right of control over Dixon by
the church. 39 But the real basis for imposing vicarious liability seems more
likely to have been the court's finding that Dixon's trip was a direct
economic benefit to the church and in no way personal to Dixon. His trip
saved the church from paying for a commercial delivery of the materials.
A similar case is Watson v. Ben.' ° Plaintiff was injured in a collision
involving a truck driven by Beard, who was employed as a service
technician by Solid Controls, Inc., which rented and serviced oil field
equipment. 41 He had completed his regular shift, "punched out," and was
on his way home from Solid's shop when the accident occurred. 42 Beard
was on twenty-four hour call that day 43 and was returning home to await
any call." The court found that Beard was subject to Solid's control at the
time of the accident. 45 He was subject to being called to work as soon as
he got home.4 He went straight home from the shop, taking the direct
route, so he could be available right away.47
But as Justice Stoker pointed out in his dissent, 4 Beard's status on the
way home was really the same as that of any employee returning home after
work, just as his status would also be personal while he was at home
awaiting a possible call. He was not "about his employer's business.
The more plausible explanation for imposing vicarious liability on Solid
is found in the court's statement that Solid derived substantial benefit from
Beard's use of his vehicle.5 ° He carried equipment and tools in it, and
used it to get to the shop and to job sites, from which he often drove
straight home. 1

37. 616 So. 2d at 771.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 772.
Id.
459 So. 2d 230 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 231.
Id.
id. He was on call for six days and then off call for two. Id. at 232.
459 So. 2d at 231.
Id. at 234.
Id.
Id.
dissenting).
Id. at 237 (Stoker, J.,
Id. at 237-38.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 233.
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While an employer may be held vicariously liable for the negligence
of an employee who is driving his own vehicle, as in Whetstone52 and
Watson,53 courts are much more likely to impose vicarious liability when
the vehicle is owned by the employer. 5' In many states there is a rebuttable presumption that 'an employee is acting within the scope of his
employment when he is driving his employer's vehicle at the time of the
accident, and only strong and convincing evidence will rebut this presumption.5 5 Frequently, the most important considerations in such cases are
whether the employee was serving the interest of the employer at the time
of the accident, and whether the employer benefitted from the employee's
use of the vehicle.56
III. APPARENT SERVANT
As discussed above, the usual basis for imposing vicarious liability on
an employer is a master/servant relationship with a right of control over the
physical conduct and the method by which the work is done. However,
cases exist where vicarious liability has been imposed because the actor who
causes the injury is the apparent servant or apparent agent of the employer,
even though the actual relationship is employer/independent contractor.
Many of these cases, especially in recent years, have involved the liability
of medical institutions for the negligence of independent contractors
practicing on their premises.57 However, there have also been many such
cases in fields other than health care.
The theory of apparent agent/servant was well stated in Drummond v.
5
Hilton Hotel Corporation:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and
thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or
skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third
person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one

52. 616 So. 2d 764 (1st Cir. 1993).
53. 459 So. 2d 230 (3d Cir. 1984).
54. See, e.g., Anderson v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 589 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Iil. App.
Ct. 1992) (holding that liability for negligence of driver attaches only to one who owns
vehicle or has right to control car).
55. See, e.g., Taylor v. Dupree, 484 So. 2d 986, 988 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
56. Id. at 988-89.
57. See John Dwight Ingram, Liability of Medical Institutions for the Negligence of
Independent Contractors Practicing on Their Premises, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
101 (1994).
58. 501 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1980).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 16

appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.59
Three elements must usually be established to prove apparent agency:
(1) the principal's consent to or knowing acquiescence in the agent's
exercise of authority;
(2) the third person's knowledge of the facts and good faith belief that
the agent possessed such authority; and
(3) the third person's reliance on the agent's apparent authority to his
or her detriment. 60
A. IS RELIANCE REQUIRED?

In many jurisdictions, if the name and/or trademark of the employer of
a negligent driver is displayed on the vehicle, there is a rebuttable presumption that the vehicle is owned by the employer and that the driver is 6a1
servant of the employer acting within the scope of his employment.
Based on this presumption, the court in Thomas v. Checker Cab Co. 62 held
that the presence of Checker's insignia and color scheme on a cab, and the
fact that.Checker's central switchboard dispatched cabs by radio, created an
appearance, and was sufficient to constitute a prima facie showing of an
employer/employee relationship between Checker and the drivers, and that
Checker had control.6 a However, the court held that the appearance alone
was not enough to create vicarious liability, since the injured person was a
passenger in an automobile which collided with the Checker cab, and thus
did not rely on the appearance, in comparison to the reliance of a passenger
in the cab.'
In contrast, reliance by the injured person on an appearance of a
master/servant relationship was not required in Buchanan v. Canada Dry
65 In that case, the plaintiff Buchanan's son was killed when
Corporation.
his car was hit by a truck owned by Southeast-Atlantic, the regional
manufacturer and distributor for Canada Dry.6 Clearly there was no
59. Id. at 31.
60. Wabash Indep. Oil Co. v. King & Wills Ins. Agency, 618 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (II1.
App. Ct. 1993) (citations omitted).
61. See Capozi v. Hearst Publishing Co., 92 A.2d 177, 180-81 (Pa. 1952) (citing
Sefton v. Valley Dairy Co., 28 A.2d 313, 314 (Pa. 1942)).
62. 238 N.W.2d 558 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
63. Id. at 560-61.
64. Id. at 561. The court went on to hold that, in view of the presumption of
Checker's right of control, Checker would have to prove that it did not have a sufficient right
of control to support the imposition of vicarious liability. Id. at 561-62.
65. 226 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).
66. Id. at 614.
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reliance on any appearance. Despite that, the court held that vicarious
liability could be imposed on the bases that the truck driver wore a Canada
Dry uniform, the truck was loaded with Canada Dry beverages and inscribed
with Canada Dry insignia and advertising, the phone listing was for Canada
Dry at the distributor's address, and the phone at the distributor's office was
67
answered "Canada Dry.,
B. WAS THERE RELIANCE?

Where reliance is required, as is usually the case, the court will require
at a minimum that the injured person relied on the reputation of the alleged
employer-master in electing to do business with the alleged employeeservant. For example, in Arcenaux v. Texaco, Inc.,68 a service station
attendant lit a cigarette while filling the gas tank in a truck. 69 This ignited
the gasoline, which the attendant sprayed into the cab of the truck,
subsequently burning the five plaintiffs. 70 The court refused to impose
vicarious liability on Texaco on the theory of being the apparent master of
the service station operator. 71 There was no evidence that plaintiffs went
to that service station because they believed Texaco was its operator.72 In
fact, the plaintiff driver had testified at his deposition that he chose this
service station because he needed gas and it was more convenient than other
stations.
A similar case, by coincidence also involving Texaco, was Duvall v.
T.W.A. 74 A negligent truck driver caused a collision with the plaintiff. 7"
The truck had been loaned to T.W.A. by Texaco, the driver was employed
76
by T.W.A., and Texaco had no control over the driver or the truck.

67. Id. at 616. But see Juarbe v. City of Philadelphia, 431 A.2d 1073 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1981), where plaintiff had slipped and fallen on an accumulation of petroleum products on
the sidewalk of a gas station operated by a franchisee/lessee of Exxon. Although the station
displayed Exxon signs, the dealer's staff all wore Exxon uniforms and badges, and only
Exxon products were sold, the court rejected vicarious liability on the basis of this
appearance, since there was no evidence that the plaintiff relied on the dealer representing
Exxon when she fell on the sidewalk. Id. at 1079.
68. 623 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Louisiana law).
69. Id. at 925.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 928.

72. Id. at 927.
73. Id.

74. 219 P.2d 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).

75. Id. at 465.

76. Id. at 470.
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Although the truck was red (Texaco's well-known color) and bore Texaco
insignia, the court held that vicarious liability would not be imposed on
Texaco on the basis of ostensible agency, as there was no reliance. 7 As
the court stated, "It cannot reasonably be contended that a motorist would
be more likely to wish to collide with a truck bearing the insignia of The
Texas Company than with one bearing any other insignia."7' 8
A good example of a situation where there was found to be reasonable
reliance on the appearance of an employer-master/employee-servant
relationship is Murray v. Hills Cab Co.79 A passenger in a taxicab was
injured due to the negligence of the cab driver. The cab was painted
defendant's distinctive color, bore its name and insignia, and defendant was
in radio contact with the cab.80 The appellate court held that the trial court
did not err in finding as a matter of law that the driver was an agent by
estoppel of the cab company. 8' The court expressly distinguished this case
from another where the injured person was not a passenger in the cab whose
driver caused the injury.82
C. RELIANCE ON WHAT?

If reliance is required, a question remains: on what must the injured
person have relied--the reputation of the apparent employer-master, or the
apparent existence of control over the actions of the apparent employeeservant? There are many cases holding that vicarious liability may be
imposed on the basis that the injured person relied on the reputation of the
apparent employer-master, without any affirmative showing of reliance on
an actual master/servant relationship. In Billops v. Magness Construction
Co.,83 the court stated that there often is no reasonable way for an ordinary
person to know he is dealing with anyone other than the apparent master,
and people often rely on the apparent master as a "quality enterprise."8 4
Similarly, in Grizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 85 plaintiff's van ran into a tractor
trailer due to its brakes failing.8 6 The van had supposedly been repaired

77. Id.
78. Id.

79. 198 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
80. Id. at 469.

81. Id.
82. Id.

83. 391 A.2d 196 (Del. 1978).
84. Id. at 199.
85. 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971).

86. Id. at 309.
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by the operator of a Texaco station, where Texaco insignia were displayed
and Texaco products were sold. 7 The plaintiff was a regular patron of this
station and had said that he assumed Texaco would be responsible for the
work on the van; he relied on this and had confidence in Texaco.88 In
holding that Texaco could be held vicariously liable, the court noted that
signs on the premises said "expert foreign car mechanic," and that signs at
the station and in national advertising said: "Trust your car to the man who
wears the star." 89 Thus, Texaco invited and encouraged reliance.'
Another example of reliance on the reputation of the alleged master can
be found in Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co.9' A department store advertised
that it had a department for dentistry. 92 The plaintiff went there and was
injured by the dentist, who in fact owned the dentistry department and was
not an employee of the store. 93 The court held that the department store
could be held vicariously liable, because plaintiff had a right to rely on the
department store employing a skillful dentist and also on there being a
94
responsible party to answer in damages should there be malpractice.
An injured party is often able to prove that he relied not only on the
reputation of the alleged master but also on the appearance of a right of
control over the actions of the alleged servant. In Keefe v. Carpet &
Upholstery Cleaning by Houndstooth, Inc., the plaintiff's wife regularly
received the defendant's advertisements for carpet cleaning in the mail, and
had a coupon.' She called the number on the coupon and ordered a carpet
cleaning.97 The defendant's dispatcher gave the order to Marion Johnson,

87. Id.

88. Id. at 308-09; see also B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 370 A.2d 554, 564-65 (Md. 1977)
(Levine, J., dissenting). The plaintiff needed gas and water, and stopped at the B.P. station
because he always dealt with B.P.; there were two other stations in sight, but he chose B.P.
because he trusted the skill of its agents and the quality of its products. Id. at 565.
89. 437 F.2d at 310.
90. Id. Contrast this with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Lesch, 570 A.2d 840 (Md. 1990),
where the court found that the plaintiffs did not patronize the gas station because of their
reliance on Chevron's ownership or operation of the station, but rather because of their
reliance on their high regard for the dealer's mechanical ability and personal integrity. Id.
at 849. They had stayed with the dealer when he changed from Sinclair to B.P. to Chevron.

Id.

91.
92.
93.
94.

60 N.E. 597 (N.Y. 1901).
Id. at 597.
Id.
Id. at 598.
95. 444 S.E.2d 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
96. Id. at 858.

97. Id.
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who then phoned plaintiff's wife and made an appointment.98 When Johnson
arrived at her house he said he was "Marion from Houndstooth." 99 The
invoice form asked that checks be made payable to defendant.'0° The
plaintiff subsequently slipped and fell on water placed on. the floor by
Johnson.'' The court found that the plaintiff and his wife relied on the facts
stated above, and would have no reason to believe they were customers of
anyone other than the defendant."°2 They relied on defendant's advertising
and reputation and on its control over the person who cleaned the carpet. 0 3
Both forms of reliance can also be found in Impastato v.
DeGirolamo.'°4 In that case, the plaintiff took her son to Dr. Citrin's office
in January for treatment of a sore throat.'0 5 She returned to his office in June
when her son was again ill.'0 6 The receptionist gave her her son's file and
sent her back to the examining room." 7 The plaintiff then found that Dr.
Citrin was on vacation, and a Dr. Mehta was seeing his patients.0" Due to
a misdiagnosis by Dr. Mehta, the plaintiffs son died."°
The court first stated that "[iut is undisputed that a referral of a patient
by one doctor to another absent partnership, employment, or agency, does
not impose liability for any malpractice on the referring doctor. '"" ° But
the court went on to find that plaintiff could reasonably rely on the
appearance that Dr. Mehta was subject to control by Dr. Citrin, and she only
took her son to that office because of her confidence in Dr. Citrin."

98. Keefe, 444 S.E.2d at 858.
99. Id. at 859.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 858.
102. Id. at 859.
103. Id.; see also Hill v. Newman, 316 A.2d 8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973). The
Plaintiff purchased from Grant's furniture which had nicks and scratches when delivered.
Id. at 10. He reported this to Grant's and was assured someone would be sent to fix it. Id.
She then received a call from a man who said he was from Grant's, and an appointment was
made. Id. When the man arrived at the home he identified himself as a man from Grant's
who had come to fix the furniture. Id. His negligent spraying of lacquer caused explosion.
Id. The court held Grant's vicariously liable. Id. "She accepted the services based on
reasonable belief in apparent agency." Id.
104. 459 N.Y.S.2d 512 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1983).
105. Id. at 513.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 513.
109. Id.
110. Id.
at 514.
111. Id.
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When courts do require reliance by the injured party in a belief that
there is a master/servant relationship between the actor and the alleged
employer-master, it will often be difficult for the injured party to establish
such reliance. For example, in Johnson v. Wagner Provision C0.,12 the
plaintiff slipped on a greasy substance which had been spilled on the floor
of a market." 3 Wagner Provision Co. owned the market and sold meat
and other products there." 4 It also rented some space in the market to
There were no signs to indicate
others who sold food products there.'
that these sellers were independent of Wagner." 6 Any negligence in-7
volved in the plaintiffs fall was by an employee of one of the renters."i
The court refused to impose vicarious liability on Wagner, because there
was no reliance by the plaintiff on any appearance of a relationship between
Wagner and the renter's employee."' The plaintiff did not even know of
the existence of the renter's employee at the time of her fall." 9
However, there certainly are cases where courts have found that the
injured party did rely on the appearance of control by the alleged master.
For example, in Mayfield v. Boy Scouts of America, 20 a cub scout was
injured during a campout. '2' The evidence showed that the adult scout
leaders were required to wear Boy Scout uniforms and badges, use Boy
Scout supplies and accessories, and follow Boy Scouts of America policies,
procedures, rules, and regulations.' 22 The mother of the injured cub scout
alleged that she relied on the appearance of control by the Boy Scouts of
America.' 23 The appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment, holding that agency by estoppel could be found between the Boy
Scouts of America and the volunteer leaders. 24

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

49 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1943).
Id. at 926.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 928.
Id.
643 N.E.2d 565 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 567.
Id. at 567-68.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 571.
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IV. FRANCHISES
Many cases where the outcome is determined by issues of the real
and/or apparent relationship between an actor and a person or entity who the
injured party seeks to hold vicariously liable involve franchises, such as gas
stations, fast food sellers, and hotels or motels. As the court said in Greil
v. Travelodge International, Inc., 2 "[t]he business franchise system
provides an effective means by which to increase sales of the trade mark
goods or services."'' 26 The owner of a trademark must control the licensees of the mark in order to "guarantee[ I that third parties dealing with the
franchisee will receive goods or services of the quality which they have
learned to associate with the trademark."'127 The mere operation of a
business by a franchisee using a well-known trademark may be sufficient to
establish at least the appearance of a right of control 2 in the franchisor.
"Some degree of control by the franchisor over the franchisee [is probably]
inherent in the franchise relationship . . [and t]he fact that the franchise
agreement expressly denies the existence of an agency relationship is not in
itself determinative of the matter."'' 29 Franchise agreements usually
reserve to the franchisor as many rights as "possible to maintain control and
to protect the product and service covered by the trademark or
tradename." 3 °
Whether or not there is a sufficient right of control in the franchisor to
establish an actual agency relationship in fact, there is often a strong
appearanceof an agency relationship. It is often the franchisor's name or
trademark alone which causes members of the public to deal with the
franchisee.
125. 541 N.E.2d 1288 (Il. App. Ct. 1989) (applying California law, as provided for in
franchise agreement). A motel guest was injured when he jumped from second floor window
to escape a robber in his room. Id. at 1289. The court held that either real or apparent
agency could be found. Id. at 1293.
126. Id. at 1292.
127. Id.
128. "Actual control of the manner of work is not essential; rather, it is the right to
control which is determinative." Drexel v. Union Prescription Ctrs., Inc., 582 F.2d 781, 785
(3d Cir. 1978) (citations omitted).

Many provisions of the franchise agreement could give

defendant right to control business operations; could also find defendant led public to believe
it was dealing, not with local independent pharmacist, but rather with nationally established
and uniformly controlled establishment.
129. Id. at 786; see also Fernander v. Thigpen, 293 S.E.2d 424 (S.C. 1982) (holding
that provision in franchise agreement that franchisee is independent contractor is not
conclusive).
130. Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 197 (Del. 1978).
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For example, a hungry motorist, needing a quick meal in an
unfamiliar town, is likely to go into any drive-in that he sees, if the
only identifying signs [are] Bill's Hamburgers or Joe's Tacos.
However, this is clearly not the case if, instead, the signs read
McDonald's or Dairy Queen. The motorist is much more likely to
choose the drive-in whose name he recognizes and associates with
a particular kind of service and food. The franchisor, by displaying
the brand name, is saying to the public that at this particular drive-in
you will receive the same kind of food and beverages that you
receive at any other drive-in at which this sign is displayed. In
short, the franchisor is "holding out" all the franchises as the same.
If the signs are accepted as "holding out" all the retail dealers as the
same, reasonable reliance is not far behind. The mass media
advertising employed by the franchisors can only help to reenforce
the public's reliance on the brand name. It is not hard to believe that
there are many people.. . who believe that all service stations or
drive-ins or clothes cleaners displaying the same name are run by
the same company.'
The provisions in the franchise agreement alone are often held to be
sufficient to establish a right of control and thus a basis for vicarious liability
of the franchisor. A typical example is Parker v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,32
where the court listed twenty-four items from the franchise agreement, plus
"Domino's Concept and Objectives" in the operating manual.' 33 The court
pointed out that:
[t]he manual which Domino's provides to. its franchisees is a
veritable bible for overseeing a Domino's operation. It contains
prescriptions for every conceivable facet of a business: from the
elements of preparing the perfect pizza to maintaining accurate
books; from advertising and promotional ideas to routing and
delivery guidelines; from order-taking instructions to oven- tending
rules; from organization to sanitation. The manual even offers a
wide array of techniques for "boxing and cutting" the pizza, as well
as tips on running the franchise to achieve an optimum profit. The
manual literally leaves nothing to chance. The complexity behind
every element of the operation gives new meaning to the familiar
slogan that delivery is to be, "Fast, Hot and Free."'"
131. John F. Stuart, Comment, A Franchisor'sLiabilityfor the Torts of His Franchisee,
5 U.S.F. L. REV. 118, 130 (1970).
132. 629 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
133. Id. at 1028.
134. Id. at 1029.
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Yet, despite the aversion of franchisors to vicarious liability, it is easy to
understand their reluctance to give up the right to control franchisees, since
"franchising, the multi-billion dollar entrepreneurial goliath, thrives so long as
'
it can retain control of its service, product, and trade name." 135
Even where the courts do not find a sufficient right of actual control in
the franchisor, they may still impose vicarious liability on the basis of the
appearance of a right of control. Adams v. Duncan Transfer & Storage of
Morristown'36 provides a good example. Mr. Adams was going to work in
England for a while.'37 Mrs. Adams took care of the moving and storage. 38 "Due to her previous experience with North American Van Lines,
she was attracted to their advertisement in the yellow pages."' 39 It was the
largest ad, had North American's name and logo, "expert moving and storage,"
and so on. 40 At the bottom of the ad appeared the name Duncan Transfer
& Storage Co., two phone numbers and an address, and a picture of a van with
"North American Van Lines" on the trailer. 4' Mrs. Adams called one of the
phone numbers and told them she had goods to ship to England and other
goods to store. 42 She assumed Duncan was an agent for North American
for both moving and storage, and was not informed to the contrary.' 43 In
fact, Duncan was not an agent of North American for storage.'4
The vans which picked up all of the Adams' goods had North American
insignia, the inventory of goods was headed North American, the labels put on
all the goods said North American and had its logo. 45 Under the agency
agreement, North American had authority to approve or disapprove an agent's
advertising using North American's name.'"6
The court held that North American was liable for the damage to the
Adams' goods while in storage, since any reader of the ad in the yellow pages

135. Singleton v. International Dairy Queen, Inc., 332 A.2d 160, 162 (Del. Super. Ct.
1975). After listing numerous aspects of the operation which were subject to control by
Dairy Queen, including control of portions of food and a "nebulously defined sanction of
termination by the unilateral action of the franchisor," the court pointed out that "[tihe very
lifeblood of the agent is in the hands of the franchisor." Id. at 161-63.
136. 757 S.W.2d 336 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
137. Id. at 337.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 337-38.
146. Id. at 338.
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would think Duncan was a North American agent for both moving and
storage.'47 North American created this appearance, or at least allowed its
creation.' 48
Other courts, however, refuse to imposevicarious liability on a franchisor
where there may be an appearance of control but no right of control actually
exists. 4 9 These courts base non-liability on their view that it is:
common knowledge ... that distinctive colors and trade mark signs
are displayed at gasoline stations by independent dealers of
petroleum product suppliers. These signs and emblems represent no
more than notice to the motorist than a given company's products
are being marketed at the station....
Neither can we view the dealer's practice of honoring the producer's
50
credit cards as indicative of a master and servant relationship.
In the court's view, one might
[a]s well argue that, because the word "Chevrolet" or "Buick" is
displayed in front of a place of business, General Motors would be
estopped to claim that it was not the owner of the business. It is a
matter of common knowledge that these trademark signs are
displayed throughout the country by independent dealers. 5 '
There are also some cases where a franchisor is held directly liable to an
injured party rather than on the basis of vicarious liability. For instance, in
O'Neill v. Startex Petroleum, Inc.,I52 the court held that it was a question of
fact whether the franchiser had a sufficient right of control to create a duty of
care as to the safety of the premises.' 53 If so, and the duty was breached, it
would constitute direct negligence of the franchisor. 54

147. Adams, 757 S.W.2d at 338-39.
148. Id. at 338; see also Chevron Oil Co. v. Sutton, 515 P.2d 1283 (N.M. 1973)
"Chevron advertised in the telephone directory that its stations performed auto repairs and
that its repairmen were skillful." Id. at 1287. The plaintiff relied on this, plus "signs,
uniforms and credit card privileges which indicated to the public that [the dealer] was under
control of and was an agent of Chevron." Id.
149. See Apple v. Standard Oil, Div. of Am. Oil Co., 307 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Cal.
1969).
150.Id. at 112.
151. Id. at 114 (citation omitted); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Lesch, 570 A.2d 840
(Md. 1990) (citing several cases utilizing the "common knowledge" line of reasoning).
152. 715 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); see also Revco Discount Drug Centers of
Ga., Inc. v. Famble, 326 S.E.2d 532 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a business inviter
owes a public duty to protect invitees from abusive language and conduct by employees of
drug store).
153. Id. at 804.
154. Id. at 806.
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V. CONCLUSION

As we have seen, most courts impose vicarious liability on an alleged
employer-master when the latter has a right to control the physical conduct or
method of doing the work of the person who causes an injury. Some courts
extend this liability to situations where there is in fact no real control, but there
is an appearance of control. It is also usually required that the actor's activity
which causes the injury must be at least partly intended to benefit the
employer-master.
It is sometimes suggested that the "control" test is cumbersome to apply,
producing contrasting results in cases with quite similar facts, and that it would
be better to impose vicarious liability whenever the person causing injury is
acting for the benefit of the alleged employer-master.' 5 This approach is
usually called the "enterprise" theory. 6 The rationale is that the "enterprise" will reap the fruits and profits from the activities of those acting on its
behalf, and accordingly should bear the burdens created by those activities too.
As applied specifically to the franchise system, the court in Greil v. Travelodge International,Inc.' said that the franchisor benefits greatly from the
operations of its franchisees, and "is in the better position to distribute losses
....Imposing liability on the franchisor is a strong incentive for franchisors
to exercise great care in selecting their franchisees and, in turn, protect the
public interest.'158That reasoning can just as well be applied to any of the
similar situations discussed in this article, and I find it very persuasive.

155. See Cox v. Prince George's County, 460 A.2d 1038 (Md. 1983) (deciding that a
jury could find that police officers' actions were in furtherance of county's business).
156. Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 140 (Alaska 1972).
157. 541 N.E.2d 1288 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989).
158. Id. at 1293; see also Wabash Indep. Oil Co. v. King & Wills Ins. Agency, 618
N.E.2d 1214, 1218 (11. App. Ct. 1993) (explaining that when one of two innocent persons
must suffer a loss, it should be borne by the one whose conduct made the injury possible or
who could have prevented it).

